IAEA/Iran 10.09.2007: nuclear material not diverted, plutonium concern resolved, timeline consensed

Content

bq. *IAEA/Iran 10 Sep 2007: non-diversion of nuclear material OK, concerns about plutonium and Karaj resolved, fuel enrichment continues, timeline defined and agreed for all outstanding issues*

h2. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 September 2007, Vienna, Austria, Mohamed ElBaradei
  
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2007/ebsp2007n013.html#iran

_Statements of the Director General_

_10 September 2007, Vienna, Austria_

"IAEA":http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Atomic_Energy_Agency Board of Governors

_Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors_

by IAEA Director General Dr. "Mohamed ElBaradei":http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_ElBaradei

The report before you provides an update on the
implementation of Agency safeguards in the Islamic Republic of
Iran. The report makes four main points.

First, the Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has continued to provide
the access and reporting needed to enable Agency verification in
this regard.

Second, Iran has provided the Agency with additional information
and access needed to resolve a number of long outstanding
issues. In particular, Agency questions regarding past plutonium
experiments in Iran have been satisfactorily answered, and this
issue has been resolved. Questions about the presence and origin
of high enriched uranium particles at the Karaj Waste Storage
Facility have also been resolved.

Third, contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, calling
on Iran to take certain confidence building measures, Iran has
not suspended its enrichment related activities, and is
continuing with the construction and operation of the Fuel
Enrichment Plant at Natanz. Iran is also continuing with its
construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak. This is
regrettable.

Fourth, despite repeated requests by the Board and the Security
Council to Iran, the Agency has so far been unable to verify
certain important aspects relevant to the scope and nature of
Iran´s nuclear programme. It was this situation that triggered a
crisis of confidence about the nature of Iran´s nuclear
programme, which led to a series of actions by the UN Security
Council. However, during a meeting I had with the Secretary of
the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Dr. Larijani, it
was agreed that Iran would work with the Agency to develop a work
plan for resolving all outstanding verification issues. A copy of
the resulting work plan between Iran and the Secretariat is
attached to my report.

This is the first time that Iran has agreed on a plan to address
all outstanding issues, with a defined timeline, and is therefore
an important step in the right direction. Naturally, the key to
gauging Iran´s commitment will be its willingness to implement
this work plan fully and in a timely manner. This would require
active cooperation by Iran and its undertaking of all the
transparency measures needed to reconstruct the history of its
nuclear programme - measures that are provided for in the
additional protocol and beyond, and which include access to
locations, documents and individuals, as well as answers to all
questions the Agency may need to ask in order to reach a
technical conclusion on a particular issue. Resolving all
outstanding verification issues in the next two to three months,
after a long deadlock, would go a long way towards building the
confidence of the international community in the peaceful nature
of Iran´s past nuclear programme.

But equally important, Iran obviously needs to continue to build
confidence in the scope and nature of its current nuclear
programme, including renewed access by the Agency to information
relevant to ongoing advanced centrifuge research. To that end,
and given the special history of Iran´s nuclear programme, it
would be indispensable for Iran to ratify and bring into force
its additional protocol, as called for by the Security Council
and the Board. This would enable the Agency to provide assurances
not only regarding declared nuclear material but, equally
important, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material
and activities in Iran.

Finally, I continue to hope that conditions will be created soon
to make it possible for the resumption of negotiations between
Iran and all relevant parties. I still believe it is only through
negotiations that a durable solution could be achieved - a
solution that provides the international community with the
required level of assurance and "enables Iran to exercise its
rights under the NPT":http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty#Third_pillar:_peaceful_use_of_nuclear_energy. To this end I repeat that a "double
time-out" of all enrichment related activities and of sanctions
could provide a breathing space for negotiations to be
resumed. The earlier we move from confrontation and distrust to
dialogue and confidence building, the better for Iran and for the
international community.

"full statement (includes other issues than Iran) on IAEA website, 10.09.2007":http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2007/ebsp2007n013.html#iran

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